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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal presents the issue of the appropriate 
procedure to be used by the district court when it 
concludes that there were fundamental procedural 
irregularities in the course of an arbitration hearing 








Teamsters Local 312, affiliated with the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, ("Local 312" or "the 
Union") is the certified bargaining unit for truck drivers and 
haulers operating in the Bensalem, Pennsylvania waste 
water transportation terminal of appellee Matlack, Inc. 
("Matlack"). Local 312 and Matlack are partners to a 
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") that has been 
extended indefinitely by mutual agreement. As part of its 
operations, Matlack arranges for non-employee owner- 
operators who are under its supervision to drop off their 
trailers containing shipments of waste water to Matlack's 
Bensalem terminal. Those trailers arriving in Bensalem are 
not certified to haul waste water to their ultimate 
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destinations in New Jersey. Local 312 employees are 
responsible for obtaining the necessary health and safety 
certifications from Trenton, New Jersey and then hauling 
the deposited trailers to environmental treatment facilities 
in either Deepwater or Logan Township, New Jersey. 
 
According to Article 50.1 of the parties' Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, which is entitled "Work 
Preservation," Matlack is expressly prohibited from 
diverting or subcontracting to any other plants, businesses 
or non-bargaining unit employees, or to any other mode of 
operation, any of the hauling work that was then performed 
or to be assigned to the bargaining unit. See Art. 50.1, App. 
at 38.1 
 
Sometime in April 1994, employees of Local 312 noticed 
that the number of trailer loads of waste water arriving in 
the Bensalem terminal was decreasing markedly. After 
making some inquiries, the employees were informed that 
many of Matlack's incoming waste water loads were being 
deposited at another terminal in Elkton, Maryland. Based 
on this information, on June 1, 1994, Union President 
Timothy Lehman filed a grievance letter with the Company 
which constituted Step 1 of the grievance procedures set 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The provision reads in full: 
 
Section 50.1 -- Work Preservation 
 
For the purpose of preserving work and job opportunities for the 
employees covered by this Agreement, the Employer agrees that no 
operation, work or services of the kind, nature or type covered by, 
or presently performed or hereafter assigned to the collective 
bargaining unit by the Employer will be subcontracted, transferred, 
leased, diverted, assigned or conveyed in full or in part (hereinafter 
referred to as "divert" or "subcontract"), by the Employer to any 
other plant, business, person, or non-unit employees, or to any 
other mode of operation, unless specifically provided and permitted 
in this Agreement. 
 
In addition, the Employer agrees that it will not, as hereinafter set 
forth, subcontract or divert the work presently performed by or 
hereafter assigned to, its employees to other business entities owned 
and/or controlled by the Employer, or its parent, subsidiaries or 
affiliates. 
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out in § 7.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.2 The 
letter stated: 
 
Please consider this letter as a formal grievance 
under our current collective bargaining agreement 
regarding waste water loads that were previously 
handled by the Bensalem, PA terminal and are now 
handled by your Elkton, MD terminal utilizing a 
tractor that was transferred from Swedesboro. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, these loads originate in 
Muscatine, Iowa or other parts of the Northern 
Region and are relayed into New Jersey out of 
Elkton, MD. 
 
We view this as a violation of Article 50 and, as such, 
request a meeting as scheduled at once to discuss. 
 
App. at 41. 
 
On August 9, 1994, Lehman met with Michael Lynch, the 
Bensalem Terminal Manager, in accordance with Step 2 of 
the grievance procedures to discuss the grievance contained 
in the letter. At the meeting Lynch informed Lehman that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 7.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement describes the 
Grievance Procedures in relevant part: 
 
Step 1. All grievances must be made known in writing to the other 
party within seven (7) working days after the reason for such 
grievance has occurred. 
 
. . . 
 
Step 2. If the disposition of the matter by the Terminal Manager in 
charge, or his duly authorized representative, is not satisfactory, the 
matter must be taken up by the Business Agent, and the Employer's 
Regional Representative, or other representatives of the Employer 
with authority to act, within five (5) working days of the written 
disposition set forth in Step 1. 
 
. . . 
 
Step 3. If the disposition of the matter by the Regional 
Representative or other representatives of the employer with 
authority to act, is not satisfactory either party has the right to file 
its grievance with the Joint Committee. . . . 
 
App. at 18. 
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the waste water loads in question were originating from 
locations in addition to those in Muscatine, Iowa or other 
parts of the Northern Region. Lehman then made a 
handwritten amendment to the grievance letter indicating 
that the grievance was meant to cover all allegedly diverted 
shipments ever assigned to the Bensalem terminal, not only 
those suspected to originate from Muscatine, Iowa or"other 
parts of the Northern Region." App. at 41 ("Amended -- 
8/9/94 -- 9:31 am -- To any waste water that came into 
and out of this terminal!"). Although Lynch refused to sign 
the amended grievance, he did not object to it, and Lehman 
noted this fact on the letter. Id. 
 
Nothing was resolved at this grievance meeting or at a 
Joint Committee meeting held on September 12, 1994, in 
accordance with Step 3 of the grievance procedures. The 
Company maintained at both grievance proceedings that 
any shipments coming from Muscatine or elsewhere had 
never been actually "assigned" to Bensalem as 
contemplated by the "Work Preservation" guarantee of the 
CBA, but were part of "system-wide work" which could be 
dispatched to any terminal location without regard to the 
jurisdictional restriction in Article 50. The Union's position 
was that proof of a marked decrease in the number of 
wastewater shipments from locations such as Muscatine, in 
the absence of company evidence to the contrary, satisfied 
the contractually required presumption that work is being 
diverted to other, non-bargaining units in violation of 
Article 50. 
 
The parties agreed to arbitration and a hearing was held 
on April 27, 1995 before Arbitrator Charles D. Long. 
Matlack was represented by J. Carlisle Peet and Local 312 
by Mark Muller. There was considerable confusion in the 
course of the arbitration proceeding. At the outset of the 
hearing, Matlack's counsel announced that he wanted to 
raise two procedural defenses not previously mentioned in 
the prior grievance proceedings: the first, a"timeliness" 
objection arguing that the Union's June 1, 1994 grievance 
letter was filed after the seven day filing requirement set 
forth in the CBA; the second, an objection that the"scope" 
of the grievance contained in the letter was limited to those 
allegedly improper shipments that originated out of 
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Muscatine, Iowa alone and not those referred to by the 
clause "or other parts of the Northern Region" or by the 
handwritten amendment. Matlack also announced that it 
was not prepared to address the substantive issue of the 
grievance, namely whether there was an actual diversion of 
shipments "assigned" to Bensalem bargaining unit 
employees in violation of Article 50. App. at 190-92, 197. 
 
After Union counsel objected to Matlack's attempt to 
focus the hearing only on the procedural aspects of the 
grievance letter, the arbitrator said to Matlack: 
 
You'd better present your arguments as to what the 
grievance was and the scope of the substance, 
subject to jurisdiction hearing this, and then proceed 
on to the substance. So (inaudible) -- so far as it 
relates to the limited load that the company speaks 
of. 
 
App. at 199. 
 
Soon after, Matlack reiterated that it was unprepared to 
address anything beyond the scope of the grievance, to 
which the arbitrator replied, "I will try and make an effort, 
in order to determine how we can agree to that -- in effect, 
as long as we're all here, let's go with the Muscatine part of 
the substance." App at 201. He continued, "I will make . . . 
a determination on the scope of the issue prior to the 
holding of a second meeting, because that determination 
will determine whether or not the second day of hearing is 
necessary." Id. 
 
Later, after confusion about the proper scope of a cross- 
examination, the arbitrator said, 
 
Because everybody is here, I'm going to let the union 
proceed, even though the case may extend beyond 
Muscatine. If, after the hearing today, I determine 
that the issue is broader than just Muscatine, we'll 
have to reconvene for the company to deal with these 
other issues. And if it means recalling these 
particular witnesses so you can reopen cross- 
examination, I'll certainly permit you to do that. 
 
App. at 216. Again, after more controversy over the scope of 
the day's hearing, the arbitrator said: 
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I am more concerned that, in resolving this problem, 
it is resolved on a full factual record and, therefore, 
if, in fact, the issue is determined to go beyond the 
scope of Muscatine, Iowa, I'll permit the company to 
address it at a subsequent time. 
 
App. at 232-33. Thus, the arbitrator appears to have 
concluded that he would permit broad questioning of the 
witnesses on all the issues -- procedural and substantive 
-- in order to create a full factual record, but that he would 
permit Matlack to address the merits of the Article 50 
argument at a later date. 
 
Again at the close of the day's hearing, the arbitrator 
appeared to signal to the parties that he would only decide 
the procedural issues presented that day and that Matlack 
could address and brief the merits of the dispute at a later 
date. The following colloquy occurred: 
 
Mr. Peet 
[counsel for Matlack]: I would like to brief the issue of the 
grievance. And I think trying to 
brief the other issue (inaudible) we 
may want to come back, depending 
upon your points on the grievance 
issue. Based upon your ruling 
(inaudible), I'd like to brief the case, 
depending on how you rule and 
how we see the grievance issue. 
 
. . . 
 
Arbitrator:   I have no objection. As a matter of fact, I 
was just going to say, Mr. Lehman [Local 
312's president], its a little unusual to 
have a proceeding and then -- and then 
and my only question really -- my only 
comment (inaudible) what Mr. Peet had 
suggested was going to be (inaudible) need 
not brief it, which is go ahead and issue a 
ruling on the -- on the scope of the issue. 
If there was (inaudible) the broader issue 
for a second day of hearing, I would then 
go ahead and address the whole shooting 
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match and then brief everything or close 
orally. 
 
I have no problem if Mr. Peet wants to 
address the scope of the issue individually, 
and whether you do it orally or brief form 
is up to you. If you want to brief it 
(inaudible) I would just ask not to take too 
long because of the day of submitting 
(inaudible). 
 
Mr. Peet:   I would like to brief. 
 
Mr. Muller [counsel for Local 312]:   I am going to brief 
the whole thing, 
the whole ball of 
wax. 
 
. . . 
 
Arbitrator:   You understand, Mr. Muller, you're going 
to exchange briefs and you'll have the 
benefit of your brief on that. 
 
App. at 325-327. 
 
Based upon its understanding of the arbitrator's 
intentions, Matlack submitted a post-hearing brief that only 
addressed the timeliness of the Union's letter of June 1, 
1994 and whether the letter's scope extended beyond the 
Muscatine loads. Matlack stated in its brief its 
understanding that, "In the event the Arbitrator ruled that 
the alleged amendment to the grievance was valid, the 
Company would have the right to reopen the hearing for the 
purposes of further cross-examining the witnesses the 
Union presented at the April 27th Hearing, and presenting 
new evidence." App. at 49. In the Union's post-hearing 
brief, the Union answered all the procedural objections 
made by Matlack, and argued that the merits of the dispute 
rendered Matlack in violation of Article 50 and also that no 
additional hearing was necessary as Matlack never provided 
any evidence to rebut the established presumption of 
diversion and would thus be estopped from presenting such 
evidence in future proceeding. App. at 62-72. 
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On June 13, 1995, Arbitrator Long sent both parties an 
award that clearly purported to render judgment in favor of 
the Union on the procedural objections regarding the scope 
and timeliness of the grievance letter as well as on the 
merits of the grievance. See App. at 89-99 (opinion, 
decision, and remedy of Arbitrator Long).3  He decided that 
the grievance letter was timely filed, that the handwritten 
amendment to the amendment extended the scope of the 
grievance to those loads originating in areas other than 
Muscatine, Iowa, and that Matlack violated Article 50 by 
diverting Muscatine loads from the Bensalem terminal. He 
awarded the Union back pay and remanded the matter to 
the Step 2 grievance procedure for disposition of those 
disputed shipments other than those from Muscatine. 
 
On June 14, 1995 Matlack wrote to the arbitrator and 
expressed "great shock" that the arbitrator had rendered a 
decision on the merits of the grievance since all parties to 
the hearing had understood that Matlack would have 
another opportunity to present evidence on that 
substantive issue. App. at 101. What followed was aflurry 
of correspondence between Matlack and the Union about 
the propriety of the scope of the judgment and, ultimately, 
Arbitrator Long's decision to withdraw as arbitrator. On 
July 17, 1995, Arbitrator Long sent the parties a letter 
confirming his withdrawal. Again both parties sent letters 
disputing what was actually adjudged by the arbitrator and 
what remained to be decided. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In his written award, the arbitrator announced that he would be 
addressing the following issues: 
 
1. Is the grievance of June 1, 1994, timely filed pursuant to Article 
7, section 7.2, of the collective bargaining agreement? 
 
2. Is the amendment of August 9, 1994, timely and, otherwise, 
valid? 
 
3. If not, is the grievance filed on June 1, 1994, limited solely to the 
loads of waste water originating in Muscatine, Iowa? 
 
4. If it is determined that the grievance is timelyfiled, has there 
been a violation of Article 50 of the collective bargaining agreement, 
as alleged? 
 
App. at 81. 
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Arbitrator Long responded on July 31, 1995 in an 
attempt to clarify where he believed the case currently 
stood: 
 
My decision to withdraw from this matter concerned 
a misunderstanding concerning the procedure to be 
followed prior to a decision resolving the substantive 
portion of the issue which is separate and unrelated to 
that portion of the issue concerning the scope of the 
grievance. Consistent with the record at the close of the 
hearing on April 27, 1995, it was my intent to leave the 
matter in the following posture: 
 
1. a binding decision dated June 13th, 1995 
extending the scope of the underlying substantive 
issue to include the grievance of June 1, 1995 as 
amended during the step 2 grievance meeting on 
August 9, 1995. 
 
2. no decision concerning the underlying 
substantive issue of whether the Employer's conduct 
violated Article 50, Subcontracting, of the collective 
bargaining agreement, as alleged. 
 
App. at 110. Based on this letter, Matlack refused to 
comply with the arbitrator's June 13, 1995 decision and 
sought the Union's agreement to rehear the matter before a 




District Court Procedure 
 
On September 7, 1995, Local 312 filed a complaint in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 301(c) of the 
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1995), seeking to enforce the original arbitration award in 
its entirety including both its procedural and substantive 
portions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, submitting correspondence and deposition 
testimony from Arbitrator Long. Local 312 argued that the 
June 13, 1995 decision was a final award and, under well 
established doctrine, was entitled to complete deference by 
the court. Matlack contended that the July 31, 1995 letter 
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and the arbitrator's withdrawal clearly voided the 
substantive portion of the award and entitled it to a new 
arbitration proceeding. Matlack filed the deposition of 
Arbitrator Long, which contained the following testimony: 
 
BY MR. MULLER [Counsel for the Union]: 
 
Q: Mr. Long, at any time, did you communicate to either 
Mr. Peet [counsel for Matlack] or myself, either verbally 
or in writing, that your opinion issued on June 13, 
1995, was vacated? 
 
A: No, sir. 
 
See Teamsters 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 482, 484 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
The district court found that "Long's answer at his 
deposition raised questions in the court's mind about his 
letter of July 31" and that it was "[f]aced with some 
uncertainty as to what Arbitrator Long intended after 
issuing his June 13, 1995 award," and declined to grant 
summary judgment on the submissions. Id. The court 
requested that Arbitrator Long testify at an evidentiary 
hearing, and rejected the Union's objection to the court's 
decision to call the arbitrator as a witness. Id. at 484-85. 
After hearing Long's testimony, the district court found that 
the arbitrator had led Matlack to believe that he would not 
render a decision on the merits of the dispute and would 
permit Matlack to address that issue at a later date. Id. at 
484. The court concluded that the ultimate award followed 
from a fundamental procedural irregularity which justified 
vacating the tainted portion of the award and remanding on 
the merits. The court ordered that the arbitration award of 
June 13, 1995 was properly enforceable "as to the 




This case requires us to resolve two legal issues. First, 
whether the doctrine of functus officio precluded the district 
court from examining the arbitrator's July 31, 1995 letter 
which acknowledged a procedural irregularity and clarified 
the intended scope of the arbitration award. Second, 
assuming the letter was properly considered, whether the 
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district court had the legal power to vacate a portion of the 




Functus Officio Doctrine 
 
Local 312 contends that according to the long-standing 
doctrine of functus officio an arbitrator's power is exhausted 
immediately after s/he reaches a final decision, regardless 
of the correctness of that decision. It argues that, therefore, 
Arbitrator Long's letter purportedly clarifying his decision 
was a legal nullity and the original award as submitted, 
resolving both the procedural and substantive issues in the 
Union's favor, must be final. We conclude, however, that 
because the arbitrator's letter merely related to the 
procedural status, and did not attempt to alter the 
substance of his analysis, the letter was not proscribed by 
the functus officio doctrine. 
 
The doctrine of functus officio, Latin for a task performed,4 
was applied strictly at common law to prevent an arbitrator 
from in any way revising, re-examining, or supplementing 
his award. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied 
Workers Int'l Union v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 
846-47 (7th Cir. 1995); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha 
Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1991). The rule 
provided simply that when "arbitrators have executed their 
award and declared their decision they are functus officio 
and have no power or authority to proceed further." 
Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 
980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951). 
 
The policy underlying the common law doctrine derives 
from a perception that arbitrators, unlike judges, are not 
institutionally sheltered from "the potential evil of outside 
communication" and are thus particularly susceptible to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Black's explains that the term is "[a]pplied to an officer whose term 
has expired and who has consequently no further official authority; and 
also to an instrument, power, agency, etc., which has fulfilled the 
purpose of its creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect." 
Black's Law Dictionary 673 (6th ed. 1990). 
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various ex parte influences that might affect a conclusion. 
La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572, 
n.13 (3d Cir. 1967). As the Seventh Circuit stated in 
Excelsior Foundry, functus officio conceives of arbitrators as 
"ad hoc judges -- judges for a case; and when the case is 
over, they cease to be judges and go back to being law 
professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in 
private life." 56 F.3d at 847. In the same opinion, the court 
opined that the functus officio doctrine was motivated 
primarily by judicial antagonism toward arbitrators and a 
derogation of the arbitral process -- originating"in the bad 
old days when judges were hostile to arbitration and 
ingenious in hamstringing it." Id. at 846; see also Courier- 
Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 
273, 278 (1st Cir. 1983) (recognizing that limitations on 
arbitrator's post award authority rested on court's hostility 
toward arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism). 
 
However, after the Supreme Court instructed federal 
courts to fashion and apply a substantive body of federal 
labor law in § 301 LMRA enforcement proceedings, 
see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 
456 (1957), the federal courts have been less strict in 
applying the common law functus officio rule in reviewing 
labor disputes. See, e.g., Locals 2222, 2320-2327, Int'l Bhd. 
of Elec. Workers v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
628 F.2d 644, 647 (1st Cir. 1980) (considered doctrine 
irrelevant in ordering resubmission of existing arbitration 
award to original arbitrators for amplification); Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327, 
332 (4th Cir. 1959) (upholding resubmission of award to 
arbitrator because original hostility to arbitration process 
less relevant in labor disputes), aff'd in relevant part, 363 
U.S. 593, 599 (1960); see generally, United Steelworkers v. 
Ideal Cement Co., 762 F.2d 837, 841 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(listing cases). 
 
This court considered the continued applicability of the 
functus officio doctrine in Colonial Penn, a non-labor case in 
which the district court ruled that an arbitration panel in 
a reinsurance dispute was permitted to reconvene in order 
to correct a mistaken assumption of fact. 943 F.2d at 
329-30. We acknowledged that the doctrine remains viable, 
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particularly when the arbitrator is asked to reconsider or 
amend the merits of an initial award, but listed the 
doctrine's recognized limitations: "(1) an arbi trator can 
correct a mistake which is apparent on the face of his 
award; (2) where the award does not adjudicate an issue 
which has been submitted, then as to such issue the 
arbitrator has not exhausted his function and it remains 
open to him for subsequent determination; and (3)  where 
the award, although seemingly complete, leaves doubt 
whether the submission has been fully executed, an 
ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is entitled to clarify." 
Id. (citing La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
These exceptions from the functus officio doctrine were 
narrowly drawn to prevent arbitrators from engaging in 
practices that might encourage them to change their 
reasoning about a decision, to redirect a distribution of an 
award, or to change a party's expectations about its rights 
and liabilities contained in an award. See, e.g. Colonial 
Penn, 943 F.2d at 332 (emphasizing need to prevent parties 
from attempting to persuade arbitrators "to overturn an 
adverse award"). Therefore, whether a case falls within one 
of these categories must be considered in light of the 
underlying rationale for the modern application of functus 
officio. 
 
The exception under category (1) above, which allo ws an 
arbitrator to correct a mistake apparent on the face of the 
award, is designed for cases of clerical mistakes or obvious 
errors of arithmatic computation. Id. In Colonial Penn we 
concluded that this exception did not apply to alleged 
mistakes where extraneous facts must be considered. Id. 
 
The rationale for the exception under category (2)  above, 
which authorizes an arbitrator to decide a remaining issue 
which has been submitted by the parties but not resolved, 
is that the arbitration agreement between the parties is still 
in force and the arbitrator's power over the remainder of 
the unresolved submission continues. Therefore,"the 
arbitrator is not exposed to any greater risk of impropriety 
than would normally exist during the pendency of the 
arbitration proceedings." La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573. 
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The case before us falls within neither category (1)  nor 
(2). The arbitrator's July 31 letter did not purport to correct 
any mistakes appearing on the face of the arbitration award 
nor did the arbitrator leave undecided a particular issue 
submitted by the parties. If anything, Arbitrator Long 
decided more than the parties had anticipated, and the 
rationale for the second exception would not appear to 
accommodate the inverse factual situation. 
 
The coverage of category (3) above, which entitles  an 
arbitrator to clarify an ambiguity in a "seemingly complete" 
award where there is "doubt whether the submission has 
been fully executed," Colonial Penn, 943 F.2d at 332, would 
not undermine the policy considerations that prohibit 
arbitrators from re-examining awards "for there is no 
opportunity for redetermination on the merits of what has 
already been decided," La Vale, 378 F.2d at 573. The La 
Vale decision illustrates the situation in which 
resubmission to an arbitration panel for clarification is 
permissible. The award had been in favor of a contractor, 
Noonan, for approximately $31,000. La Vale, 378 F.2d at 
570. La Vale subsequently sued Noonan to recover 
approximately $25,000 because it had delivered Noonan a 
deposit of approximately $56,000 during the pendency of 
the proceeding. Noonan contended that the arbitration 
panel had recognized that the $56,000 represented a partial 
payment on account and that the $31,000 award was thus 
meant to be supplemental. 
 
We upheld the district court's resubmission of the issue 
to the arbitration panel for clarification as to whether the 
sum of $56,000 was a deposit or a payment on account. Id. 
at 573. In light of the policies underlying the functus officio 
doctrine, we concluded that the doctrine would not prevent 
resubmission because it would "in no way reopen the 
merits of the controversy." Id. 
 
The decision in La Vale is consistent with the approach 
followed elsewhere. See, e.g., Courier Citizen, 702 F.2d at 
279 (arbitrator allowed to explain remedy sketched out in 
award, because situation unlike cases where "arbitrator 
issued a second award fundamentally inconsistent with the 
first award."); Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council v. 
General Elec. Co., 353 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1965) 
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(resubmission to arbitrator permissible because "not for the 
purpose of relitigating or modifying the award"); 42 Pa. 
C.S.A. § 7315(a)(2) (Pennsylvania Arbitration Act 
authorizing resubmission where "arbitrators awarded upon 
a matter not submitted to them and the award may be 
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon 
the issues submitted."). 
 
In this case, we need not decide whether the 
circumstances would have justified resubmission to the 
arbitrator because Arbitrator Long withdrew before the 
matter was brought to the district court. Therefore, the 
issue before us concerns the propriety of the district court's 
consideration of arbitral post-award comment. 
 
In a series of cases from various circuits, the courts have 
considered supplementary information from the arbitrator 
that addressed a fundamental procedural irregularity. As 
the Seventh Circuit stated in Excelsior Foundry, if the 
functus officio doctrine were to prevent parties from 
clarifying what they perceive to be a fundamental 
procedural irregularity "[t]he result would be a gap in the 
system of arbitral justice that would make very little sense." 
56 F.3d at 847 (post award, ex parte communications 
between union and arbitrator permissible and binding 
where necessary to complete or clarify an award). 
 
The Eighth Circuit considered a somewhat similar 
situation in Local P-9, United Food and Commercial Workers 
Int'l Union v. Hormel & Co., 776 F.2d 1393, 1394 (8th Cir. 
1985), where an arbitrator issued an award in favor of the 
Union but attached a letter offering to meet with the parties 
if they wished to discuss his decision. After all the parties 
reconvened, the arbitrator issued an amended award in 
favor of Hormel. In an action brought by the Union to 
enforce the original award and vacate the "amended" 
version, the Company attempted to introduce a post-award 
affidavit from the arbitrator which stated that he intended 
the original award to serve only as a non-binding draft. The 
court of appeals held that, despite the status of the affidavit 
as a "post-award comment," the district court should have 
considered the paragraph of the affidavit that stated that 
the arbitrator had informed the parties at the initial hearing 
that the first award would be only preliminary and open for 
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reconsideration. Id. at 1395. After considering the policy 
reasons behind the functus officio rule, the court concluded 
that the paragraph was admissible because it "does not 
impeach the initial award or explain the arbitrator's 
decision-making process, but merely describes the 
procedural process which the arbitrator allegedly told the 
parties he would follow." Id. at 1395-96. Accordingly, the 
court directed the district court to examine that portion of 
the affidavit as well as "all other evidence -- including the 
testimony of persons who were present at the initial hearing 
as to what the arbitrator did or did not say -- to determine 
whether the award was a preliminary or final one." Id. at 
1396. 
 
In Ideal Cement, an arbitrator resolving a labor dispute 
about an employee's termination mailed a preliminary 
award to both parties with the suggestion that the parties 
could submit additional medical information for the 
arbitrator's review. 762 F.2d at 839. The Union submitted 
the employee's relevant medical records but provided no 
copy to Ideal. The arbitrator issued a final award in favor of 
the Union, but attached a cover letter explaining that he 
had in fact finalized the award prior to receiving the Union's 
ex parte communication, and that the information did not 
influence his judgment. Nevertheless, in order to avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety, the arbitrator offered Ideal 
the choice to accept the award or to disqualify the 
arbitrator and void the award. At Ideal's request, the 
arbitrator disqualified himself and set aside the award. Id. 
 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to 
enforce the award. The court of appeals described the 
arbitrator's offer to void his decision as a "procedural event" 
entitled to heightened deference from federal courts. Id. at 
841. The court endorsed the arbitrator's actions, suggesting 
that "[t]o avoid the appearance of impropriety he chose to 
utilize a procedural device not unlike the remittitur/new 
trial alternative offered to an overly-compensated plaintiff." 
Id. 
 
In this case, Arbitrator Long issued an award that 
covered matters that he had advised the parties would not 
be decided without further evidence and briefing, causing a 
fundamental procedural irregularity. It might have been 
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possible to determine the existence of this irregularity from 
the tapes of the arbitration hearing without the July 31 
letter as they evidence at least some difference between 
what the parties were told at the time and what the 
arbitrator did, but the parties agree that the tapes, which 
were unofficial, were inaudible in parts and incomplete. 
Under these circumstances, it was not improper for the 
arbitrator to issue the letter of July 31 clarifying his 
"misunderstanding concerning the procedure to be followed 
prior to a decision resolving the substantive portion of the 
issue" and the basis for disqualifying himself. App. at 110. 
As in Ideal Cement, this was a procedural device that was 
not relevant to the merits of the controversy but which 
"outlin[ed] his procedural decision." 762 F.2d at 842. As the 
court concluded in that case, "[t]hat the arbitrator chose to 
use such a procedure to protect the integrity of the 
arbitration process should not be subject to judicial second 




Vacation of the Award 
 
In the posture in which this matter was first presented to 
the district court by Local 312's suit for enforcement of the 
arbitration award, the arbitrator had already withdrawn, 
returned Matlack's arbitration file, and written the July 31 
letter which set forth the scope of the award itself. That 
letter clarifies that there had been two questions presented 
for arbitration -- the first being the procedural question as 
to whether the Union's grievance of June 1, 1994 had been 
timely filed and expanded by the amendment of 
August 9, 1994 (he decided in favor of the Union's position 
that it had) -- and the second being the substantive issue 
as to whether Matlack had violated the collective bargaining 
agreement (the letter said he had intended to make no 
decision). This record provided ample basis for the court's 
ultimate decision to enforce only that portion of the award 
that all parties agreed had been submitted dealing with the 
scope of the grievance. 
 
Local 312 objected to the court's decision to call the 
arbitrator to testify at a hearing as to the procedure the 
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arbitrator had intended to follow. The district court 
explained that it "simply sought to find out what the 
arbitrator said at the April 27 arbitration hearing 
concerning the procedure he intended to follow." Matlack, 
Inc., 916 F. Supp. at 485. While at least one court has 
permitted testimony from the arbitrator to clarify the status 
of an award, see, e.g., Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 
624 F.2d 1255, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980) (arbitrator permitted 
to write post-award letter and testify at trial in order to 
clarify decision), calling upon the arbitrator to testify as to 
his or her intentions is questionable in light of the well- 
established principle that it is not the province of a court to 
clarify the arbitrator's award. See Colonial Penn, 943 F.3d 
at 334. Under ordinary circumstances we would not 
sanction calling an arbitrator to testify, as the written 
record would suffice to permit the court to rule on 
enforcement vel non. However, we believe we can decide 
this appeal without reference to the arbitrator's testimony. 
 
Consistent with the July 31 letter, the district court 
determined that the arbitrator had indicated to the parties 
that he would only reach a decision on the timeliness and 
scope issues and reserve a decision on the merits of the 
Union's grievance until after Matlack had an opportunity to 
address that issue. Based on that determination, the court 
vacated the portion of the arbitrator's award that purported 
to resolve the merits of the Union's grievance. 
 
We exercise plenary review of the district court's decision 
resolving cross motions for summary judgment. United 
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 430, 
55 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1995). We conclude that because 
the record of the arbitration proceedings as well as the 
arbitrator's July 31 letter confirming the intended scope of 
the arbitration award established that there was a 
fundamental procedural irregularity in the arbitration 
proceeding, the district court had authority to vacate the 
portion of the arbitrator's award dealing with the substance 
of the grievance. 
 
Local 312 argues that the district court's decision to 
vacate the arbitrator's original determination on the merits 
is inconsistent with the long line of case law firmly 
establishing the limitations on judicial intervention in 
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arbitration decisions. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("as long as the 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the 
contract" the award must be enforced, even if the court is 
"convinced [that the arbitrator] committed serious error"); 
News America Publications, Inc. v. Newark Typographical 
Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990) ("there 
must be absolutely no support at all in the record justifying 
the arbitrator's determinations for a court to deny 
enforcement of an award"). 
 
However, the doctrine severely limiting judicial review of 
arbitration awards is inapposite here because the district 
court did not purport to revisit, reinterpret, or overrule the 
arbitrator's legal or factual analysis. The correctness of the 
arbitrator's substantive conclusion was not under scrutiny. 
 
At common law, an arbitration award may be set aside 
where there is an adequate showing of "[f]raud, partiality, 
misconduct, violation of a specific command of law, or 
vagueness rendering enforcement impractical, or a showing 
that enforcement would be contrary to public policy." Local 
863 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, 
Inc., 773 F.2d 530, 534 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal citations 
omitted), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986). In addition, 
"[p]rocedural irregularities . . . may also result in such 
fundamental unfairness as to warrant the vacation of an 
arbitral award." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 
Union 1823 v. WGN of Colorado, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 64, 66 
(D.Colo. 1985); Robert A. Gorman, Labor Law 600-602 
(1976). 
 
Examples of procedural irregularities that have merited 
district court suspension of arbitration awards are varied. 
See Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread 
Co., 291 F.2d 894, 901 (4th Cir. 1961) (affirming denial of 
union's enforcement request because arbitrator went 
outside record and based decision on findings from a 
different arbitration proceeding); Harvey Aluminum v. 
United Steelworkers of America, 263 F.Supp. 488 (C.D.Cal. 
1967) (arbitration award remanded where arbitrator refused 
to admit certain evidence in rebuttal without giving parties 
warning about application of evidentiary rules); Electrical 
Workers, 615 F.Supp. at 67-68 (vacating arbitration board 
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award and remanding because neutral arbitrator rendered 
decision without obtaining the signatures of the partisan 
arbitrators, so that there was a "lack of evidence of any 
significant decision-making process by the majority of the 
board"). 
 
In this case the parties undertook arbitration pursuant to 
their collective bargaining agreement, and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1995), is not binding. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the Act imposes constraints 
on judicial review of arbitration awards similar to those in 
the labor context, its provisions are instructive here. 
Section 10(a)(3) of the Act (formerly 10(c)) allows a court to 
vacate an arbitration award "[w]here the arbitrators were 
guilty of . . . any . . . misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced." Pursuant to this provision, we 
have held that a court has the power to vacate an 
arbitration award where an arbitrator receives ex parte 
information to the prejudice of one of the parties. Mutual 
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 
Ltd., 868 F.2d 52, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
In interpreting another portion of § 10(c) of the Act, we 
also have allowed a court to vacate an arbitration award if 
the arbitrator's refusal to hear proffered testimony "so 
affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was 
deprived of a fair hearing." Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 
18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d 
Cir), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968). Moreover, it has 
become axiomatic that a district court may vacate an award 
if a party to an arbitration proceeding has not been given 
notice and opportunity to present arguments and evidence 
on the merits of the dispute. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 
685 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992); Konkar 
Maritime Enters., S.A. v. Compagnie Belge D'Affretement, 
668 F.Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (listing cases). 
 
The National Labor Relations Board has itself imposed 
minimum due process standards in evaluating the fairness 
of arbitration proceedings resolving unfair labor practice 
issues. Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 
(1955). Thus, it has refused to defer to an arbitrator's 
decision where evidence was deliberately withheld from an 
arbitrator, Precision Fittings, 141 NLRB 1034, 1041-43 
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(1963), where the grievant was given insufficient time to 
prepare, Gateway Transp. Co., 137 NLRB 1763, 1764 
(1962), or was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine 
a witness, Versi Craft Corp., 227 NLRB 877, 887 (1977). 
 
In this case, the record establishes that the arbitrator 
made a fundamental procedural error in deciding the 
merits of the controversy after advising the parties that he 
would not do so until after he decided the procedural issues 
and until Matlack had an opportunity to present its case on 
the merits. In the district court's words, the arbitrator 
simply "told the parties one thing and, albeit mistakenly, 
did another." Matlack, Inc., 916 F.Supp. at 486. The 
arbitrator's resolution of the merits of the Union's Article 50 
grievance without benefit of Matlack's evidence or argument 
on the issue severely impeded Matlack's right to notice and 
opportunity to be heard in such an adversarial proceeding. 
See Konkar Maritime Enters., 668 F.Supp. at 271. This is 
precisely the type of procedural error that "undermine[s] 
the validity of the arbitration process," Gorman, Labor Law 
602, permits an arbitrator to take remedial measures such 
as withdrawal, and authorizes a district court to vacate and 




We conclude that the functus officio doctrine did not 
proscribe the district court from examining the arbitrator's 
post award letter which purported to clarify the intended 
scope of the award, and that the arbitrator's award was 
partially the product of a fundamental procedural 
irregularity. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's 
decision to vacate the substantive portion of the award and 
to remand the remainder of the proceedings to another 
arbitrator. 
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